So much of the discussion about Tottenham Hotspur gets magnetised towards the issue of the manager that it can occlude the even bigger questions. Whatever view you might take on Ange Postecoglou — we will take a day off from the two sides of that argument here — no one can fully explain what has happened to Spurs in the last two years by looking at Postecoglou alone.
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The most important thing that happened to Tottenham in 2023 was not the arrival of Postecoglou, for better or worse. It was the departure of Harry Kane to Bayern Munich, Spurs’ all-time record goalscorer and arguably their greatest ever player. Kane was synonymous with Tottenham and had spent nine years driving the team forward with mountains of goals and assists.
You could even argue that the second-most important thing to happen to Tottenham in the last few years, after the departure of Kane, is the decline of Son Heung-min. For years Spurs relied on his athleticism and ruthless finishing, the perfect partner for Kane. He is still at the club but is clearly not the same player he was at his peak.
This has thrown up a clear strategic challenge which Spurs have been wrestling with for the last few years: how do you buy enough quality in the frontline to compensate? No one player could ever come in and replace Kane, he exists on a level all of his own. But maybe the right combination of signings could hope to replace Kane in the aggregate.
Much of the attention on Spurs’ transfer policy in the last few years has been focused on the pivot towards youth. And it is true that since Johan Lange came in as technical director Spurs have made a point of going for young talents like Wilson Odobert, Lucas Bergvall, Archie Gray and Antonin Kinsky. There has also been attention on the reduced wage bill, leaving Spurs spending just 42 per cent of their revenue on salaries, according to last year’s figures.
But that is not the only story of the last few years. Even while operating within their restrictive wage structure, Tottenham have also been willing to spend big fees at the right moment. Not just on prospects either, but on ready-made Premier League players. This never used to be the Tottenham way but in the last five years they have been far more willing to spend big fees. Especially from struggling Premier League teams with an incentive to sell.
Richarlison celebrates Tottenham’s Europa League semi-final win over Bodo/Glimt (Mats Torbergsen/Getty Images)
Which leads us, in a very roundabout way, to the Tottenham front three from the two legs of the Europa League semi-final against Bodo/Glimt: Richarlison, Dominic Solanke and Brennan Johnson are arguably the three leading examples of this particular policy. Three attempts to buy in the qualities that Spurs had lost when Kane left. Three players all bought for big fees from the Premier League. These three signings, in fact, make up three of the four biggest fees Spurs have ever paid. Only Tanguy Ndombele, signed for £55million in 2019, can rival them in terms of transfer fee.
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This started with Richarlison, bought from Everton at the start of the summer 2022 window. Spurs knew that Everton needed to sell in order to attempt to comply with the Premier League’s profit and sustainability rules. They moved fast to get him in, paying an initial £50m with another £10m in possible add-ons. Here was a ready-to-go Premier League forward who already had five seasons in English football behind him. And while his preference was to play as a No 9, he could play anywhere in the frontline.
In practice, Antonio Conte’s attempts to use Richarlison, Kane and Son together just gave Spurs a clunky, top-heavy feel. Richarlison struggled with injuries in his first season, scoring only one league goal. He had a brilliant run in the middle of Postecoglou’s first season, playing as a No 9 and scoring nine goals in eight Premier League games. But since then his form and fitness have been patchy again. This year he was mainly used as an occasional back-up striker. Until Glimt.
Brennan Johnson came in at the end of the summer 2023 window from Nottingham Forest for £47.5m. Even though he was bought as a prospect, injuries meant that he had to play consistently almost as soon as he arrived. And while he was not a direct replacement for Kane, he was the highest-profile attacking player they signed in the summer that Kane left.
Always high and wide on the right, Johnson played as a winger whose job was to stretch the play and attack the far post to convert crosses from the left. While he does not always offer as much in possession as Dejan Kulusevski, Johnson is a consistent goal threat. He scored five in the league last year and is this season’s top scorer with 11.
Johnson and Solanke have been regulars in Tottenham’s attack this season (Ben Stanstall/Getty Images)
And then there is Solanke. He was the star signing of last summer from Bournemouth, costing an initial £55m. As soon as he got into the team he looked like a far more reliable all-round No 9 than anyone else had since Kane left. His goal return this season is not bad — eight from 24 Premier League starts — but it has been his overall game that is most impressive. He is a relentless, selfless presser, setting the tempo for the whole team, and capable of holding the ball up and linking with team-mates. Spurs are a far better team with him in it.
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Put those three players together — Richarlison, Solanke and Johnson — and you get over £150m of transfer fees. In the context of how little money Spurs used to spend in the market, that is a huge amount. Between the three players they have started 104 Premier League games, with another 52 sub appearances. And they have a total of 40 league goals.
That might not look like a great return when weighed against the rate that Kane used to score at, nor Son at his peak. But goalscoring at that rate is extremely difficult to find on the market, no matter how much money you spend on it.
And when Postecoglou did use those three players together against Glimt, it worked like a dream. It was the first time Richarlison and Solanke had started in tandem, and the first time Richarlison had been used on the wing since October 2023. But Postecoglou wanted him to use his physicality. And in the first minute of the first leg, he won a far-post header to set up Johnson to score. Glimt could never come to terms with Richarlison and Solanke’s physicality, whether winning long balls, holding it up or pressing the Glimt defence into a mistake.
It worked as a dream, so much so that many fans will wonder if that same plan can be deployed against Manchester United in Bilbao. It was only last week that Kane finally won the trophy he left Spurs to pursue. Next week, some of the players signed to replace Kane will be aiming to win a trophy of their own.
(Top photo: Maja Hitij/Getty Images)
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