What’s next for Nuggets? Denver is wasting Nikola Jokić’s title window and has to be aggressive to fix that

Think of the Cleveland Cavaliers right now. They won 64 games. They had the second-best offense in NBA history and the Defensive Player of the Year. They swept their first-round series by 122 combined points. But they made 10 fewer 3s than the Indiana Pacers in Game 1 of their second-round series. Game 2 was lost on calls the NBA later admitted were mistakes. Suddenly, banged-up players are desperate. Darius Garland rushes back from a toe injury that clearly hadn’t healed. Donovan Mitchell aggravates an existing injury. And poof, nine days into the second round, their season is over.

That’s how the playoffs work. Your every flaw, your smallest mistakes, your tiniest misfortunes — they’re amplified 100-fold. They’re punished whether it’s the team’s fault or not. The margins, even for a team as talented and deep and balanced as Cleveland, can be that thin.

They weren’t that thin for the Denver Nuggets. They were as thick as Nikola Jokić. The best player in the world had the 68-win Thunder on the ropes multiple times. Jokić outplayed presumptive MVP Shai Gilgeous-Alexander in a second-round series that went seven games but ended in an OKC blowout. Every fear critics had about the Thunder materialized in this series. Their inexperience in close playoff games almost certainly cost them Game 1 and potentially Game 3 as well. They never found a consistent, No. 2 scoring option, and Jalen Williams struggled for much of this series. The Thunder begged the Nuggets to take this series. Jokić certainly tried.

He didn’t come up short because of bad luck or some granular strategic or lineup flaw. No, the Thunder won this series because they had nine trustworthy players and the Nuggets had three. When it mattered most, Denver often could rely on only one:

• In the first six games of this series, Nikola Jokić had 88 potential assists, but only 34 total assists. That’s a conversion rate of 38.6%. In the regular season, Jokić had a conversion rate of around 62%. He created shots. His teammates missed them.
• The series, ultimately, hinged on the fourth quarters of Games 4 (which Denver led by as many as seven points) and 5 (which Denver led by as many as nine). In those quarters, Nuggets not named Jokić shot 6 of 31 from the field and 1 of 19 from 3-point range. For reference, this means Jokić made as many spinning, one-legged 3-pointers with Chet Holmgren’s hand in his face during these quarters as his teammates made overall 3s.
• Toss out the Game 2 blowout and Game 7 as Aaron Gordon was playing injured. In Games 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, Denver’s starters outscored the Thunder by 50 points. Any lineup featuring any other player was outscored by 39.

There certainly were individual weaknesses. There are way too many weak shooters here. They needed a zone defense to mask the individual weaknesses of many of their defenders. Only two people consistently generate offense. But they all feed back into the core issue here. Jokić was sensational. Jamal Murray wasn’t efficient, but he was at least a somewhat reliable source of points until Game 7. Aaron Gordon was generally quite good, but his Game 6 hamstring injury might have swung Game 7. Everyone else ranged from “not good enough” to “not good at all.”

Christian Braun rebounded, fought on defense and scored in transition, but his shaky jumper was a major problem for Denver’s half-court offense until he started making 3s in Games 6 and 7. Michael Porter Jr. was invisible, and while he was quite clearly nursing a shoulder injury, he’s never remotely scored at the rate his salary demands in a playoff setting. The shot that Russell Westbrook found against the Clippers disappeared against the Thunder, but his long-time turnover problems reared their ugly head.

Nobody else played consistently. Peyton Watson chipped in a few minutes here and there, but was such a negative offensively that Denver couldn’t keep him on the floor. Denver’s supporting cast was so widely dismissed that 15 bench points were enough for many fans to label Game 6 “the Julian Strawther game.” An Oklahoma City reserve would never get that treatment because production is the expectation for Thunder bench players.

Reserves aren’t just backups for the Thunder. They’re weapons. Alex Caruso might have been the second-best overall player they had against Denver. Cason Wallace and Aaron Wiggins won them Game 4 from deep. The 10 minutes they got out of Jaylin Williams might have swung Game 5. When core Thunder players like Williams or Lu Dort just didn’t have it, there was always someone available to step in for them. That just wasn’t the case for the Nuggets. They consistently used only six players and trusted half of them. They had no dependable alternatives. There just were not enough good NBA players on their team.

Nobody’s asking the Nuggets to be the Thunder. It wouldn’t be financially feasible even if Denver’s front office were as brilliant as Oklahoma City’s. But even if their opportunities were more limited, they were squandered at every turn.

Where the Nuggets went wrong

Denver is the only team to use the taxpayer mid-level exception in both of the last two offseasons. The first went to Reggie Jackson, who was cap-dumped a year later. The second went to Dario Šarić, who fell out of the rotation by Thanksgiving. If they had used either of those mid-level exceptions on a usable, rotation-level veteran, then they may have won this series.

They drafted No. 29, No. 32 and No. 37 overall in 2023. They used those picks on Julian Strawther, Jalen Pickett and Hunter Tyson. It’s too early to call any of them busts yet, but none proved capable of holding down stable roles in the playoff rotation. That point in the draft is obviously a crapshoot, but the Nuggets may have missed three times. If they’d used one of those picks on, say, Andre Jackson Jr., of GG Jackson, or certainly Toumani Camara, then they may have won this series.

In free agency, they elected to let Kentavious Caldwell-Pope walk for nothing rather than jump into the second apron to keep him. Now, Caldwell-Pope had a down year in Orlando, but was also playing on a team ruined by injuries. If the Nuggets had kept him and he had played at anything remotely resembling the level he had in recent years, say it with me now: they may have won this series.

Part of the reason they couldn’t afford to pay Caldwell-Pope was the bizarre four-year, $32 million extension they gave Zeke Nnaji. They gave him this extension despite the fact that he’d never carved out a consistent rotation role. He barely played in the 2023 playoffs. Yet Denver is still stuck with three years left on his current contract. Obviously, they’d love to just dump the contract outright, but they could have also used his salary to chase a worthwhile veteran. 

Having spare second-round picks might have helped in that endeavor. They spent three to dump Reggie Jackson, but ironically, having him on the team didn’t necessarily need to take them above the second apron. They could have ducked it with a bit of diligence, and that would have allowed them to keep Jackson in the building as a tradable salary. Combining him with Nnaji and Šarić could have brought back a sizable chunk of salary. But hey, I suppose saving cash in the prime of the best player in franchise history is nice, too.

These were, ultimately, decisions on the margins. The Nuggets missed on bigger swings, too. They considered a run at Paul George last summer, according to ESPN’s Ramona Shelburne. It fell apart because they refused to consider including Braun, Strawther or Watson. Neither Watson nor Strawther has justified their exclusion from trade talks. Braun has developed into a good starter. He obviously has a lot more room to grow, and George himself is certainly in decline. Despite all of that, wouldn’t you have felt better about Denver’s chances against Oklahoma City if George had played in place of Braun and the hampered Porter Jr.?

Calvin Booth elected not to continue his pursuit of George because he felt the young players he’d drafted would extend Denver’s window. The idea was to be in the mix every year without going all-in on a single season, developing cheap depth instead of paying market rate for it. “If everything is optimized, we should win three or four [titles],” Booth told The Ringer’s Kevin O’Connor before the 2023-24 season.

That’s all well and good when the draft picks pan out. So far, they haven’t. They’re either not good enough or Michael Malone didn’t use them enough to find out. Either Booth or Malone was wrong here. It doesn’t matter who, because now, both are out of a job.

What Nuggets can still do

It seems likely that David Adelman keeps the seat he inherited from Malone. He coached a good postseason, and there’s no reason not to maintain schematic consistency. The changes have to come on the roster. Whoever is building the Nuggets next year needs to build the Nuggets for next year. No more getting cute about timelines or dynasties. No more cheaping out on payroll. No more fixation on the players in the building compared to the ones that could come in from the outside. The Nuggets have the best player in the world right now. As he just showed against the Thunder, merely having him can take you a decent chunk of the way to a championship. But he needs help, and he’s 30. The window to do this is here and now.

The obvious starting point is a possible Porter Jr. trade. Even if Murray or Gordon had struggled enough this postseason to consider moving them, neither would bring enough back to replace their production. Murray’s health is too much of a question mark. Gordon’s value is too tied to his chemistry with Jokić. 

That makes Porter, still on a 25% max contract, the odd man out. At least in basketball terms, because Jake Fischer reported in April that Denver’s owners, the Kroenke family, would struggle to trade him because he played for their alma mater: Missouri. Though, to be fair, Kroenke has denied that report.

Moving Porter could create as many problems as it would solve. He’s the highest-volume 3-point shooter on a team that attempts the fewest 3s. Denver needs to address shooting as a unit, both in terms of roster construction and offensive intention. But Porter’s $38.3 million salary is the easiest avenue to finding multiple productive players, and his youth at 26 will convince some team to bet that he still has room to grow as a creator in a less Jokić-centric offense. That his 2026-27 salary is only partially guaranteed doesn’t hurt either.

Who would want to take an upside swing on a former top prospect whose value is primarily derived from shooting? Ideally, it would be a younger team that also doesn’t take enough 3s. Detroit, Houston and New Orleans all come to mind here. All three could match Porter’s salary with multiple players to help the Nuggets round out their supporting cast.

If they were interested in George a year ago, it’s worth asking if they would be interested in Kevin Durant this summer. Matching his $54 million salary is a problem, but not an unsolvable one. Porter would obviously be the centerpiece, along with several of those young players Booth bet on. Their unprotected 2031 first-round pick would almost certainly be in the deal. This sort of trade, under the best-case scenario, would create a second-apron hard cap that would be difficult, though not impossible, to navigate. Denver couldn’t win a fair bidding war for Durant. They’d have to hope the asset-rich teams aren’t interested, and that Durant would push for them as a destination.

Whether or not Durant is the target, that 2031 pick has to be on the table. Maybe a trade similar to the Minnesota made for Rob Dillingham last year, in which they offered multiple future draft assets to a team that didn’t want another highly-drafted rookie, would be a way to address both present and future here. Houston at No. 10 would be an obvious fit. The Rockets already have too many young players it can’t find minutes for. Adding a rookie doesn’t make much sense for them. Maybe the Spurs would repeat last year’s Dillingham trade using the No. 14 pick. 

Or, if the right deal for a veteran is out there with this pick, then go and use it. Before you question its value, remember that Jazz general manager Justin Zanik called the 2031 Suns pick Utah acquired at the deadline “the most valuable asset on the market right now.” Deep future picks from older teams, to the right trading partner, are precious. Someone would give up something significant to get it.

It would be downright irresponsible of the Nuggets to get skittish about their post-Jokić future while Jokić himself is still on the team. This team has played 47 NBA seasons and the only other player in franchise history to earn First-Team All-NBA honors is David Thompson. It could be decades before the Nuggets have another chance with a player like this. Does it really matter if the team is bad for a few years after he’s gone?

Of course not. That’s the sort of conservative thinking that got Denver into this mess. They reached the mountaintop because Tim Connelly took risks and invested picks in putting a core around Jokić. They’ve spent the past two years nickel-and-diming that core out of the playoffs. They’ve been so concerned with keeping the Jokić window open as long as possible that they’re failing to leap through it while they have the chance. If they’re going to take advantage of the prime years he has left, that time has to be over. Anyone should be on the table. Their picks should be traded. The payroll, if the basketball moves demand it, should bolt beyond the second apron. There’s no telling how much longer Jokić will be able to do this. The time to invest in him is here and now.